Latin — 1533, repaired
Platonici omnia inferiora ferunt esse ideata a superioribus ideis; ideam autem definiunt esse formam supra corpora, animas, mentes, unam, simplicem, puram, immutabilem, indivisibilem, incorpoream et aeternam: atque eandem ideae omnem esse naturam. Ponunt autem ideas primo in ipso quidem bono, hoc est deo, per causae modum, solum esse relativis quibusdam rationibus inter se distinctas, ne quicquid est in mundo, sine ulla varietate fiat; convenire tamen inter se essentia, ne deus sit substantia multiplex. Ponunt secundo in ipso intelligibili, hoc est in anima mundi, per formas proprie, atque insuper absolutis formis invicem differentes, ita ut ideae in deo quidem omnes una forma sint, in anima mundi vero multae; ponuntur in sequentibus mentibus sive corpori coniunctis, sive a corpore separatis, participatione iam quadam, et gradatim iam magis magisque distinctae. Ponunt in natura tanquam semina quaedam infima formarum ab ideis infusa; ponunt in materia denique, ut umbras. Accedit ad haec, quod totidem sunt in anima mundi rationes rerum seminales, quot ideae sunt in mente divina: quibus ipsis rationibus aedificavit sibi in caelis ultra stellas etiam figuras, impressitque his omnibus proprietates.
Ab his itaque stellis, figuris ac proprietatibus omnes specierum inferiorum virtutes et proprietates dependent, ita ut quaelibet species habeat figuram caelestem sibi convenientem, ex qua etiam ei provenit sibi mirabilis potestas in operando, qualem per rationes animae mundi seminales, propriam ab idea sua suscipit dotem. Sunt enim ideae non modo causae essendi alicuius speciei, sed etiam sunt causae cuiusque virtutis, quae tali speciei inest: et hoc est quod multi dicunt philosophorum, quod virtutibus certis, scilicet certam et stabilem rationem habentibus, non fortuitis, nec casualibus, sed efficacibus, sed potentibus et indeficientibus, nihil frustra, nihil in casum agentibus, moventur in natura rerum existentes virtutes, quae quidem virtutes sunt idearum operationes; quae non errant nisi per accidens ex impuritate videlicet et inaequalitate materiae: hoc enim modo inveniuntur res etiam eiusdem speciei magis ac minus potentes, secundum puritatem vel confusionem materiae; omnes enim influxus caelestes impediri possunt per confusionem et inhabilitatem materiae. Unde Platonicis ipsis in proverbio fuit: Secundum meritum materiae influunt virtutes caelestes; de quo et Vergilius meminit, ubi canit:
Igneus est ollis vigor, et caelestis origo Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant. (verse, summarized — see flag)
Quare hae res, in quibus minus immergitur idea materiae, hoc est, quae separatorum maiorem accipiunt similitudinem, virtutes habent potentiores in operatione, similes operationi ideae separatae. Scimus itaque situm ac figuram caelestium, causam esse omnis nobilis virtutis, quae est in speciebus inferioribus.
Close translation
The Platonists hold that all lower things are ideated from the higher Ideas; and they define an Idea to be a form above bodies, souls, and minds — one, simple, pure, immutable, indivisible, incorporeal and eternal: and that this same nature belongs to every Idea. They place the Ideas, first, in the Good itself, that is, in God, in the manner of a cause, distinct among themselves only by certain relative principles, lest whatever is in the world should come to be without any variety — yet agreeing among themselves in essence, lest God be a multiple substance. They place them, second, in the intelligible itself, that is, in the soul of the world, properly through forms, and moreover differing from one another as absolute forms, such that the Ideas in God are indeed all one form, but in the soul of the world they are many; they are placed in the following minds, whether joined to body or separated from body, now by a certain participation, and now, gradually, more and more distinctly. They place in nature, as it were, certain lowest seeds of forms infused from the Ideas; they place in matter, finally, as shadows. To this is added that there are just as many seminal principles of things in the soul of the world as there are Ideas in the divine mind: by these very principles it built for itself in the heavens, beyond the stars, figures also, and impressed properties upon all these.
From these stars, then, figures, and properties, depend all the powers and properties of the lower species, such that any given species has a celestial figure suited to it, from which there comes to it also a wonderful power in acting — such a power as it receives as its own endowment from its Idea, through the seminal principles of the soul of the world. For the Ideas are not only the causes of the being of some species, but are also the causes of each power that is present in such a species: and this is what many of the philosophers say, that the powers existing in the nature of things are moved by certain powers — that is, having a certain and stable principle, not fortuitous nor accidental, but efficacious, but powerful and unfailing, doing nothing in vain, nothing at random — which powers indeed are the operations of the Ideas; and these do not go astray except by accident, namely from the impurity and inequality of matter: for in this way things even of the same species are found to be more or less powerful, according to the purity or confusion of their matter; for all celestial influences can be impeded through the confusion and unfitness of matter. Whence it was a proverb among the Platonists themselves: The celestial powers flow in according to the merit of the matter; of which Vergil too makes mention, where he sings:
A fiery vigor is in those seeds, and a celestial origin, so far as harmful bodies do not slow them. (verse, summarized — see flag)
Wherefore those things in which the Idea is less immersed in matter — that is, which receive a greater likeness to things separate — have more powerful powers in operation, resembling the operation of the separate Idea. We know, then, that the position and figure of the celestial bodies is the cause of every noble power that is present in the lower species.
Modern rendering
The Platonists claim that everything in the lower world takes its pattern from higher Ideas. They define an Idea as a form that stands above bodies, souls, and minds — one, simple, pure, unchanging, indivisible, incorporeal, and eternal, and they say every Idea shares this same nature. They locate the Ideas, first, in the Good itself, meaning God, functioning as a cause; there they're distinguished from one another only by certain relational principles, so that nothing in the world lacks variety — yet they still agree in essence, so God isn't made of multiple substances. Second, they place them in the intelligible world itself, meaning the soul of the world, properly as forms, distinguished from each other now as complete forms in their own right, so that the Ideas that are all one single form in God become many in the soul of the world. Beyond that, they're placed in successive minds, whether joined to a body or separate from one, now shared in through a kind of participation, growing gradually more and more distinct. In nature they're placed as the lowest seeds of forms, infused from the Ideas; and finally in matter, as mere shadows. Beyond this, there are exactly as many seminal principles of things in the soul of the world as there are Ideas in the divine mind, and with these very principles the soul of the world built itself figures in the heavens beyond the stars, stamping properties onto all of them.
From these stars, figures, and properties, every power and property of the lower species depends — so that any given species has a celestial figure that matches it, and from that figure comes a remarkable power to act, a power it receives as its own gift from its Idea, transmitted through the seminal principles of the world-soul. Ideas aren't just what causes a species to exist — they also cause every power found in that species. This is why many philosophers say that the powers at work in nature are moved by real forces with a fixed, stable basis — not random, not accidental, but effective, potent, and unfailing, wasting nothing and leaving nothing to chance. These powers are simply the Ideas at work, and they only go wrong by accident — namely, because of impure or uneven matter. That's why you find things of the very same species that are more or less potent depending on how pure or muddled their matter is: any celestial influence can be blocked by matter that's confused or unfit to receive it. Hence the Platonists' own proverb: celestial powers flow in according to what the matter deserves. Vergil references the same idea when he writes:
Those seeds carry a fiery vigor and a celestial origin, held back only by the harm done by their bodies. (verse, summarized — see flag)
That's why things in which the Idea is less buried in matter — things that more closely resemble what is wholly separate from matter — have more powerful effects, closer to how a separate Idea itself would act. So we know that the position and shape of the heavenly bodies is the cause behind every noble power found in the species below.
Editorial flags — draft status
- verse: Vergil, Aeneid VI.730-731 ('Igneus est ollis vigor...') given as prose summary per spec rather than reconstructed verse; latin field keeps the OCR-repaired lines.