Latin — 1533, repaired
Est theologorum quorundam opinio, Deum ipsum hominis primaevi corpus non immediate creasse, sed caelitum adiutorio ex elementis composuisse atque formasse: cui opinioni adstipulatur etiam Alcinous, ex Platonis dogmate, putans summum Deum mundi totius, deorumque et daemonum creatorem esse, atque illa idcirco immortalia esse; caetera autem, et mortalium animantium genera, iuniores deos ad mandatum summi Dei procreasse: nam si ipse haec etiam genuisset, immortalia nata fuissent. Dii itaque, ex terra et igne, aere, atque aqua, portiones quasdam mutantes ligantesque invicem, corpus unum ex omnibus confecerunt: quod animae ad ministerium subiecerunt, singulis illius potentiis singulas in eo provincias assignantes, humilioribus quidem humiliores sedes assignantes: quippe irascundiae praecordia, cupidini uterum; nobiliores autem sensus in caput, veluti in totius corporis arcem: deinde sermonis organa multifaria.
Dividunt autem sensus in externos et intimos: externos deinde in quinque omnibus notissimos partiuntur, quibus pariter quinque organa sive subiecta, quasi fundamenta quaedam, attribuuntur, sic disposita, ut quae eminentiore parte corporis collocantur, potiorem quoque puritatis ordinem obtineant: oculi enim supremo loco collocati, purissimi sunt, ignis lucisque naturae sunt cognati; deinde aures, secundum et loci et puritatis ordinem obtinentes, comparantur aeri; tertium possident nares, mediam inter aerem aquamque continentes; deinceps vero gustandi organum crassius, et aqueae naturae simillimum; postremo gradu tactus, per totum diffusus, terrae crassitudini deputatur. Puriores autem sensus sunt qui non appropinquantes sensibilibus, a longinquo percipiunt, ut visus, et auditus; deinde etiam odoratus per medium aerem non appropinquantia percipit; gustus autem non nisi propinqua sentit; tactus vero quomodo se habet, nam appropinquantia corpora sentit: et quemadmodum visus per medium aerem cernit, ita etiam tactus per mediam virgam vel baculum, dura, mollia, et humida sentit. Verum tactus solus sensibus omni animali communis est; certissimum autem hunc sensum homo possidet, hoc namque et gustu reliqua animalia praecellit, sed in aliis tribus sensibus a quibusdam animalibus evincitur, sicut a cane, qui hominem acutius videt, audit, atque olfacit; similiter acutius multis ceteris animalibus, et hominem vident lynces et aquilae.
Sensus vero interiores, ut vult Averrois, in quatuor partiti sunt, quorum primus communis appellatur, eo quod omnes quae per externos sensus hauriuntur imagines primus colligit atque perficit. Secundus, vis imaginativa, cuius officium est, ea ipsa nihil praesentia, imagines a prioribus sensibus acceptas retinere, easque retrix sentiendi naturae, quae phantasia, existimandi atque cogitandi vis est, offerre; cuius opus est, acceptis imaginibus, quid aut qualis sit id cuius illae imagines sunt, percipere, ac iudicare; atque ea ipsa, quae sic discreverit, coniunxerit, perceperit, iudicaverit, quartae potentiae, quam memoriam dicimus, servanda commendare. Erunt enim illius in genere virtutes: discursus, dispositiones, persecutiones et fugae, atque concitationes ad agendum. At in specie intellectuali, intellectiones, virtutes, disciplinarum ratio, consilium, electio. Haec autem est quae per somnia nobis futura monstrat: unde phantasia aliquando nominatur intellectus phantasticus: est enim ultimum vestigium intelligentiae, quae, ut vult Iamblichus, omnibus animi viribus adnata, omnes figuras effingit, similitudinesque specierum, et operationes, visaque, seu impressiones virium alias crassioris in alias, quae quidem a sensu micat, in opinionem excitat; quae vero ab intellectu, secundo loco offert opinioni; sed a se ipsa, ab omnibus imagines suscipit, atque per suam proprietatem, secundum assimilationem propriam designat, omnes actiones animae fingit, atque externas accommodat intimis, etiam corpori impressiones imprimit.
Habent autem sensus isti sua organa in capite: nam sensus communis, cum imaginatione, priores cerebri cellulas possidet, licet Aristoteles organum sensus communis posuerit in corde; cogitativa autem, supremum et medium capitis obtinet; deinde memoria, postremum. Porro organa vocis, atque sermonis multa sunt: siquidem interni pectoris, inter latera, musculi, thorax, pulmo, trachea, arteria, fauces, et horum maxime quod est cartilaginosum, secundum recurrentes nervos, et plectrum linguae, et omnes hae particulae et musculi, exsufflationis organa sunt. Sermonis vero organum proprium os est, in quo plasmantur, formantur, et figurantur verba et loquelae: lingua, et gurgulione, in illo plectri obtinentibus vicem, et palato sonum faciente, dentium et oris apertione, veluti in lyra chordarum similitudinem referentibus, naso insuper ad sonoritatem bonam vel malam conferente.
Supra sensibilem autem animam, quae per corporis organa vires suas explicat, supremum locum occupat mens ipsa, incorporea; et haec geminam naturam habens: unam, rerum earum quae naturae ordine continentur, causas, proprietates, progressusque perquirentem, et in veritatis contemplatione contentam, quem idcirco contemplativum intellectum vocant; alteram, mentis naturam sive vim, quae agenda quaeque fugienda sint, consultando discernens, tota in consultatione atque actione versatur, quem idcirco activum intellectum vocant. Hunc itaque ordinem potentiarum natura statuit in homine, ut per exteriores sensus cognosceremus corporalia, per interiores, ultra hoc, similitudines corporum, ulteriusque per mentem sive intellectum abstracta, quae nec corpora sunt, nec illis similia.
Et iuxta hunc triplicem potentiarum animae ordinem, tres nascuntur in anima appetitus: primus naturalis, qui est inclinatio quaedam naturae in suum finem, ut lapidis deorsum, qui inest omnibus; alius animalis, qui sequitur sensum, divisus in irascibilem et concupiscibilem; tertius intellectivus, qui appellatur voluntas: in hoc differens a sensitivo, qui est per se, illo, quae possunt offerri sensibus, nihil concupiscens nisi aliquo modo comprehensum. Voluntas vero, etsi sit per se omnium possibilium, quia tamen libera est per essentiam, potest etiam esse impossibilium, qualis fuit in daemone, appetente se esse aequale Deo: itaque voluptate et dolore continuo alteratur et depravatur, dum inferioribus potentiis assentitur. Unde quatuor ex eius depravato appetitu nascuntur in eo passiones, quibus similiter corpus nonnunquam afficitur: quarum prima vocatur oblectatio, quae est mentis sive voluntatis quaedam mollities atque assentatio, qua illi, quomodo sensus porrigunt suavitati, libentissime consentit, paret, atque obsequitur: quam idcirco definiunt esse inclinationem animi ad emollientem voluptatem. Secunda vero dicitur effusio, quae est remissio aut dissolutio virtutis, quando videlicet ultra oblectationem tota mentis vis atque intentio praesentis boni dulcedine deliquescit ac defluit, penitusque se diffundit, ac effertur ad eo fruendum. Tertia dicitur iactantia, scilicet elatio gestiens, existimans se maximum quoddam bonum consequutam, cuius possessione se insolentius efferens, exultat et inaniter gloriatur. Quarta et ultima est malevolentia, voluptas quaedam ex malo alterius sine suo emolumento. Dicitur autem sine emolumento suo, quia si quis ob utilitatem suam ex malo alterius gaudeat, hoc erit potius ex benevolentia in seipsum quam ex malevolentia in alios. Atque his quatuor passionibus, ex depravato voluptatis appetitu genitis, totidem contrarias passiones generat ipse dolor, puta horrorem, tristitiam, metum, et de bono alterius sine suo detrimento dolorem, quam dicimus invidiam, hoc est, in alienis bonis tristitiam — quemadmodum misericordia tristitia quaedam est in alienis malis.
Close translation
It is the opinion of certain theologians that God himself did not immediately create the body of the first man, but composed and formed it from the elements, with the aid of the heavenly powers; to this opinion Alcinous also assents, following the doctrine of Plato, holding that the highest God was the creator of the whole world, and of the gods and demons, and that on that account those are immortal; but that the rest, the kinds of mortal living things, the younger gods created at the command of the highest God — for if he himself had also begotten these, they would have been born immortal. The gods, then, from earth and fire, air, and water, exchanging and binding certain portions with one another, fashioned one body from them all: this they subjected to the soul for its service, assigning to each of the soul's powers its own province within it, assigning to the humbler powers the humbler seats — the organs of anger to the region of the heart, of desire to the belly; but the nobler senses to the head, as to the citadel of the whole body; and then the manifold organs of speech.
They divide the senses, moreover, into external and internal: the external, in turn, they distribute into the five best known to all, to which likewise five organs, or subjects, are assigned as a kind of foundation, arranged so that those situated in the more eminent part of the body also hold the higher rank of purity: for the eyes, placed in the highest position, are the purest, and akin to the nature of fire and light; then the ears, holding the second rank both of place and of purity, are likened to air; the nostrils hold the third place, occupying a middle position between air and water; next the organ of taste, coarser, and most similar to the watery nature; in the last rank, touch, diffused through the whole, is assigned to the coarseness of earth. The purer senses, however, are those which perceive from a distance, without approaching the sensible things — as sight and hearing; smell too perceives, through the medium of air, things not approached; but taste perceives nothing except what is near; as for touch, how it stands — it perceives bodies that come close: and just as sight discerns through the medium of air, so touch, through the medium of a rod or staff, perceives what is hard, soft, and moist. But touch alone, of the senses, is common to every animal; man possesses this sense most surely of all, for in this, as in taste, he excels the other animals; but in the other three senses he is surpassed by certain animals — as by the dog, which sees, hears, and smells more keenly than man; likewise the lynx and the eagle see more keenly than man, as do many other animals.
The interior senses, as Averroes holds, are divided into four, of which the first is called the common sense, because it first gathers and completes all the images that are drawn in through the external senses. The second is the imaginative power, whose office is to retain the images received from the prior senses, even when the things themselves are not present, and to offer them to the retentive faculty of sensing — which is fantasy, the power of judging and thinking — whose task, once the images are received, is to perceive and judge what, or of what kind, the thing is of which those images are images; and to commend those very things which it has thus discerned, joined, perceived, and judged, to the fourth power, which we call memory, to be preserved. For its powers, in general, are: discursive reasoning, dispositions, pursuits and avoidances, and impulses to act; but in the intellectual kind: understandings, powers, the rational structure of disciplines, deliberation, choice. This is the power that, through dreams, shows us the future; whence fantasy is sometimes called the phantastic intellect: for it is the furthest trace of intelligence, which, as Iamblichus holds, innate in all the powers of the soul, fashions all shapes, likenesses of forms, and operations, and visions — that is, impressions of the coarser powers passing into others — which, indeed, flashing from sense, stirs up opinion; but that which comes from intellect, it offers to opinion in the second place; but of itself it receives images from all things, and, by its own property, according to its own manner of assimilation, marks them out, fashions all the actions of the soul, and adapts external things to the inward, even impressing impressions upon the body itself.
These senses, moreover, have their organs in the head: for the common sense, together with the imagination, occupies the forward cells of the brain, although Aristotle placed the organ of the common sense in the heart; the cogitative power occupies the highest and middle part of the head; then memory, the last part. Furthermore, the organs of voice and of speech are many: for the muscles of the interior chest, between the sides, the thorax, the lung, the trachea, the windpipe, the throat, and, most of all of these, that which is cartilaginous, together with the recurrent nerves, and the plectrum of the tongue, and all these parts and muscles, are organs of exhalation. But the proper organ of speech is the mouth, in which words and speech are shaped, formed, and figured: the tongue and the gullet holding the place of the plectrum, and the palate producing sound, with the opening of the teeth and mouth, after the likeness of the strings of a lyre, the nose besides contributing to good or bad resonance.
Above the sensible soul, which unfolds its powers through the organs of the body, the highest place is occupied by the mind itself, incorporeal; and this has a twofold nature: one, which investigates the causes, properties, and processes of those things that are contained within the order of nature, and rests content in the contemplation of truth, which they therefore call the contemplative intellect; the other, a nature or power of the mind which, by deliberation, discerns what is to be done and what to be avoided, and is wholly occupied in deliberation and action, which they therefore call the active intellect. This, then, is the order of powers that nature has established in man: that through the exterior senses we should know bodily things; through the interior senses, beyond this, the likenesses of bodies; and further, through the mind or intellect, abstract things, which are neither bodies nor like bodies.
And according to this threefold order of the soul's powers, three appetites are born in the soul: the first, natural, which is a certain inclination of nature toward its own end, as of a stone downward, which is present in all things; another, animal, which follows sense, divided into the irascible and the concupiscible; the third, intellective, which is called the will: differing in this from the sensitive appetite, which is, of itself, directed only toward those things that can be presented to the senses, desiring nothing except what is in some way apprehended. The will, however, although of itself directed toward all possible things, because it is nevertheless free by its essence, can also be directed toward impossible things — such as it was in the demon, desiring to be equal to God: and so it is continually altered and depraved by pleasure and pain, insofar as it assents to the lower powers. Whence four passions are born in it from its depraved appetite, by which the body too is sometimes likewise affected: the first of which is called delight, which is a certain softness and flattering assent of the mind or will, whereby it most willingly consents, obeys, and complies with whatever the senses offer to sweetness: which they therefore define as an inclination of the mind toward softening pleasure. The second is called effusion, which is a relaxing or dissolving of strength, namely when, beyond delight, the whole force and intention of the mind melts and flows away in the sweetness of the present good, and utterly diffuses and pours itself out, and is carried away to enjoy it. The third is called boasting, namely an exulting elation, thinking itself to have obtained some very great good, in the possession of which, bearing itself too insolently, it exults and glories vainly. The fourth and last is malevolence, a certain pleasure in another's evil, without any advantage to oneself. It is said to be without advantage to oneself, because if someone rejoices at another's evil for the sake of his own benefit, this will be rather from benevolence toward himself than from malevolence toward others. And to these four passions, born of the depraved appetite for pleasure, pain itself generates just as many contrary passions — namely, horror, sadness, fear, and sorrow at another's good without any loss to oneself, which we call envy, that is, sadness at another's goods — just as pity is a certain sadness at another's evils.
Modern rendering
Some theologians hold that God didn't directly create the first man's body himself, but formed and assembled it out of the elements with the help of the heavenly powers. Alcinous agrees, following Plato: the highest God created the whole cosmos, along with the gods and demons, which is why those are immortal; the rest — mortal living things generally — were made by the younger gods at the highest God's command, since if God himself had made them directly, they would have been born immortal too. So the (lesser) gods took portions of earth, fire, air, and water, exchanged and bound them together, and built a single body out of all of them. They put that body under the soul's charge, assigning each of the soul's powers its own province within it — lower powers to lower seats: anger to the chest, desire to the belly, but the nobler senses to the head, like a citadel commanding the whole body — and then the many different organs of speech.
They split the senses into outer and inner. The outer senses come in the five everyone knows, each with its own organ or seat, arranged so that whatever sits in a more elevated part of the body also ranks higher in purity: the eyes, positioned highest, are the purest, closely related to fire and light; the ears rank second in both placement and purity, associated with air; the nose comes third, sitting between air and water; taste's organ is coarser still, closest to water; and touch, spread through the whole body, is assigned to earth's heaviness, ranking last. The purer senses are the ones that can perceive things at a distance without direct contact — sight and hearing. Smell also works at a distance, through the air, without touching its object. Taste only registers what's already close. Touch works by contact with nearby objects — though just as sight reaches through the medium of air, touch can reach through an intermediate rod or stick and still register hard, soft, and wet. Touch, though, is the one sense every animal shares; humans have it, and taste, more reliably than any other sense — but in the other three senses, some animals beat us: dogs see, hear, and smell more sharply than we do, and so do lynxes and eagles, along with plenty of other animals.
The inner senses, according to Averroes, come in four. The first is called the common sense, because it's the one that first gathers and finishes off all the images fed in through the outer senses. The second is imagination, whose job is to hold onto images from the other senses even once the things themselves are no longer present, and pass them to the faculty that actually judges and thinks about them — call it fantasy, the power of assessing and reasoning. Its task, once it has the images, is to work out and judge what the thing behind them actually is, and then hand off whatever it has sorted out, connected, perceived, and judged to the fourth power — memory — for safekeeping. Its general powers include reasoning things through, forming dispositions, pursuing or avoiding things, and stirring itself to act; on the more purely intellectual side: understanding, reasoning skill in the disciplines, deliberation, choice. This is the faculty that shows us the future through dreams — which is why fantasy is sometimes called the 'phantastic intellect': it's the outermost trace of intelligence, which, as Iamblichus holds, is woven into every power of the soul and shapes every image, likeness, and operation, every vision — effectively impressions passing from coarser powers into finer ones. What comes straight from sense stirs up opinion directly; what comes from intellect gets offered to opinion secondhand. But on its own, it takes in images from everything, marks them according to its own way of matching likeness to likeness, shapes every action of the soul, fits outward things to the inner life, and even stamps impressions onto the body itself.
These senses have their seats in the head: the common sense, along with imagination, occupies the front chambers of the brain — though Aristotle located the organ of common sense in the heart. The cogitative faculty occupies the top-middle of the head; memory, the rear. The organs of voice and speech, meanwhile, are numerous: the chest muscles, the ribcage, lung, windpipe, throat, and especially the cartilage there, along with the recurrent nerves and the tongue's 'plectrum,' are all organs of breath production. But the true organ of speech is the mouth, where words and speech are actually shaped — the tongue and throat acting like the plectrum, the palate producing sound, the teeth and lips opening like the strings of a lyre, and the nose adding to how good or bad the resulting sound is.
Above the sensory soul, which works through the body's organs, sits the incorporeal mind itself, and it has two sides. One investigates the causes, properties, and workings of things bound by nature's order, resting in the contemplation of truth — this is called the contemplative intellect. The other, deliberating over what should be done and what avoided, is entirely occupied with judgment and action — this is called the active intellect. Nature set up this hierarchy of powers in the human being so that we could know physical things through the outer senses, the likenesses of physical things through the inner senses, and abstract things — things that are neither bodies nor like bodies — through the mind or intellect.
Matching this threefold hierarchy, three drives arise in the soul. The first is natural — an inbuilt inclination toward its own end, like a stone's tendency to fall, present in everything. The second is animal, following sense, and splits into the irascible (anger-driven) and the concupiscible (desire-driven). The third is intellective, called the will — different from the sense-appetite in that the latter only ever wants what can actually be presented to the senses, desiring nothing it hasn't in some way grasped. The will, though directed by its nature toward everything possible, is free in its essence, and so can also reach for the impossible — as the demon did, wanting to be God's equal. Because of this, it's constantly reshaped and corrupted by pleasure and pain whenever it gives in to the lower powers. Four passions arise from this corrupted appetite, and the body is sometimes affected by them too. The first is delight — a kind of softness and flattering compliance of mind or will, by which it eagerly consents to, obeys, and follows whatever pleasure the senses offer; hence it's defined as an inclination of the mind toward softening pleasure. The second is called effusion — a slackening or dissolving of strength, when, going beyond mere delight, the mind's whole force and focus melts and dissolves into the sweetness of some present good, pouring itself out entirely and giving itself over to enjoying it. The third is boasting — an exultant swelling, thinking it has gained some enormous good, and, carried away by possessing it, gloating and glorying emptily. The fourth and last is malevolence — a kind of pleasure taken in someone else's misfortune, with no benefit to oneself. It's specified as 'no benefit to oneself' because if someone takes joy in another's misfortune for their own gain, that's really self-interest, not malevolence toward the other. And to these four passions, born of a corrupted appetite for pleasure, pain gives rise to an equal and opposite set: horror, sadness, fear, and sadness at another's good fortune that costs us nothing — which we call envy, meaning sadness at someone else's blessings, just as pity is a kind of sadness at someone else's misfortunes.
Editorial flags — draft status
- uncertain: the phrase 'quae quidem a sensu micat, in opinionem excitat; quae vero ab intellectu, secundo loco offert opinioni' (on fantasy relaying sense- vs. intellect-derived impressions to opinion) is syntactically dense and the OCR badly damaged in this stretch; sense preserved as closely as possible but exact clause attachment is uncertain
- list: the psychological/physiological schema (external senses, four internal senses, twofold intellect, threefold appetite, four passions) is a scholastic set-piece; term choices (e.g. 'retrix sentiendi naturae', 'phantasia') kept close to the Latin structure per spec on scholastic cruxes